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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
                  
 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 Appellants, Norman S. Marcus and Susan S. Marcus (the 
"Marcuses"), appeal an order entered by the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania staying 
their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for damages pending resolution of a 
state criminal action against them.  The Marcuses argue that the 
stay of their federal court case is inappropriate because the 
state criminal action and the federal civil rights action are not 
parallel proceedings under Colorado River Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976).  We conclude that 
the stay order issued by the district court did not effectively 
terminate the federal court litigation and accordingly dismiss 




 In July 1987, the Marcuses purchased an undeveloped lot 
in the Township of Abington, Pennsylvania.  The lot, Lot #37, was 
part of an area called "Pennock Woods," which was created 
pursuant to the "Subdivision Plan of Pennock Woods," dated June 
16, 1986, and last revised on July 9, 1986.  The Subdivision Plan 
states the "[t]he majority of the tract is heavily wooded with 
mature trees," and that "[i]t is the intent of the developer to 
maintain and/or save the majority of the existing wooded area 
except along streets or where underground utility construction is 
required."  App. 8-9.  The Marcuses purchased Lot #37 "because it 
was undeveloped, in its natural wooded state, and because they 
desire[d] to live in the woods, in substantial compliance with 
the intent of the developers as set forth in the Subdivision Plan 
of Pennock Woods."  App. 9. 
 On July 31, 1987, the Marcuses obtained a building 
permit from the Township to construct a home on Lot #37.  Their 
permit application included a site plan which specified various 
grading and erosion control measures, including a provision to 
pave the driveway and to landscape all exposed areas.  The 
Township approved the site plan. 
 In October 1990, the Township issued the Marcuses a 
temporary certificate of occupancy which required the Marcuses to 
satisfy the following conditions:  (1) complete the driveway 
paving, (2) remove dead trees and dead wood from the lot, (3) 
patch cement in both fireplaces, and (4) complete grading and 
landscaping.  The Marcuses, believing that the site plan grading 
 
 
and erosion control measures were intended only as temporary 
measures during construction of their home, opted to maintain 
their property in its natural wooded state. 
 The neighbors complained.  Thereafter, Township 
Commissioner Barbara C. Ferrara cautioned the Marcuses that they 
were required to remove dead trees and logs from their property.  
After ignoring several extensions, the Marcuses received a 
letter, dated October 3, 1991, from P. Daniel Vollrath, the 
Township's senior code enforcement official, which advised the 
Marcuses that October 31, 1991 was the new deadline for complying 
with the conditional certificate of occupancy and the terms of 
their original site plan.  In particular, the October 3 letter 
reminded the Marcuses that their site plan "shows that the 
driveway was intended to be paved and the entire site was either 
to be seeded or sodded," and warned them that if they remained in 
noncompliance they would be issued a criminal citation.  App. 19. 
 The Marcuses did nothing.  On May 19, 1992, the 
Township filed a criminal citation charging the Marcuses with 
failure to comply with Township ordinances requiring landscaping 
and compliance with approved site plans.  The Marcuses then met 
with Township officials once again and were granted yet another 
extension, until June 30, 1992.  Lawrence T. Matteo, Jr., the 
Township's superintendent of code enforcement, memorialized that 
meeting in a June 1, 1992 letter.  Because Matteo's letter did 
not specifically require "seeding or sodding," the Marcuses did 




 A hearing was held on the criminal citation before a 
Pennsylvania district justice.  The court ruled in favor of the 
Township on the charge that the Marcuses had failed to comply 
with the Township ordinances.  The Marcuses appealed the district 
justice's decision to the Pennsylvania Court of Common Pleas.  
That appeal currently is pending. 
 On August 26, 1993, the Marcuses filed an action for 
damages in federal district court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 
alleging that the Township, Vollrath, Matteo, and Ferrara, while 
acting under color of state law, violated their right to due 
process of law in that they "deliberately and arbitrarily abused 
government power" when they attempted to enforce the grading and 
erosion control provision because the "attempted enforcement 
[was] not supported in law or fact."  App. 6.  Further, the 
Marcuses charged the defendants with conspiring "to harass, 
intimidate, embarrass, annoy, abuse, and otherwise interfere with 
the [Marcuses'] liberty, privacy and due process protections."  
App. 13.  With respect to Ferrara, the Marcuses alleged that she 
"interfered with the process by which the municipality enforced 
the provisions of building permits for her own political or 
personal reasons unrelated to the merits of the building permit, 
and the law."  App. 12.  Finally, the Marcuses alleged that as a 
"direct and proximate result of the acts of Defendants, 
Plaintiffs were deprived of due process of law, and were caused 
to suffer anxiety, mental suffering and humiliation, fright, and 
incurred attorney's fees to defend themselves against the illegal 
actions of Defendants."  App. 12a. 
 
 
 The Township immediately filed a motion to stay or 
dismiss the federal action pending resolution of the Marcuses' 
state criminal court appeal.  On December 23, 1993, the district 
court granted the Township's motion, and entered an order staying 
the Marcuses' § 1983 action pursuant to the "exceptional 
circumstances" doctrine announced by the Supreme Court in 
Colorado River.  The Marcuses appeal the district court's order 
staying its federal court case. 
 
 II. 
 Although the parties themselves have not raised the 
issue, we have an independent obligation to determine whether we 
have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 before we can 
review the merits of the Marcuses' appeal.  Resolution Trust 
Corp. v. Pasquariello (In re Pasquariello), 16 F.3d 525, 528 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  We conclude that the district court's order staying 
the Marcuses' federal court action was not a "final order" as 
contemplated by § 1291.  Accordingly, we will dismiss the 
Marcuses' appeal for want of jurisdiction. 
 
 A. 
 With exceptions not here relevant, courts of appeals 
have authority to review a district court's order only if that 
order is "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Whether 
an order is "final" depends on its effect.  Stay orders normally 
are not appealable final orders because they merely delay  
proceedings in the suit.  Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury 
 
 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 n.11 (1983); Schall v. Joyce, 885 
F.2d 101, 104 (3d Cir. 1989); Cheyney State College Faculty v. 
Hufstedler, 703 F.2d 732, 735 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Hoots v. 
Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 1346-47 (3d Cir. 1978) (noting that 
mere delay does not render an order final for purposes of 
appeal).  Not all orders staying proceedings in a district court 
are unappealable, however.   
 The Supreme Court explored the difference between a 
stay from which an appeal will lie and normal stays in Moses H. 
Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).  
It held that an order staying proceedings in the district court 
in deference to an on-going state proceeding dealing with the 
same subject matter was a final order within the meaning of 28 
U.S.C. § 1291.  The Court so held because the stay permitted the 
state court to decide the sole issue in the federal case before 
the federal court reached it.  Since the state court's 
determination would have to be given collateral effect in the 
federal case, the effect of "the stay [was] to require all or an 
essential part of the federal suit to be litigated in a state 
forum," 460 U.S. at 10 n.11, and the stay thus put the plaintiff 
"effectively out of federal court," id. at 9 n.8 (emphasis 
omitted).  The Court held "that a stay order is final when the 
sole purpose and effect of the stay are precisely to surrender 
jurisdiction of a federal suit to a state court."  Id. at 10 
n.11.  The Court stressed, by way of contrast, that a stay is not 
final "merely because it may have the practical effect of 
 
 
allowing a state court to be the first to rule on a common 
issue."  Id.1   
 
 B. 
 Appellate review is inappropriate here because the stay 
entered by the district court merely delays the federal 
litigation and does not effectively terminate it.  Unlike the 
situation in Moses H. Cone, the district court's stay will be 
lifted when the state criminal proceedings are concluded and the 
Marcuses will then receive the federal adjudication of their  
§ 1983 claim to which they are entitled.    
 The action pending in the state court is a criminal 
action; the parties are the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the 
Marcuses.  The sole issues involved there are whether the 
Marcuses violated the ordinance and if so, what sanction should 
be imposed.  The Marcuses could not, or at least did not, place 
their § 1983 claim before the court in that criminal proceeding 
by way of counterclaim.  Moreover, the Marcuses did not ask the 
state court to adjudicate as a defense in the criminal case any 
                     
1.  We most recently recognized and applied this Moses H. Cone 
distinction between appealable and nonappealable stay orders in 
Trent v. Dial Medical of Florida, Inc., ____ F.3d ____ (3d Cir. 
Aug. 12, 1994).  We there held that an order having the effect of 
staying a federal proceeding was appealable because a "decision 
in [a parallel state proceeding would] constitute res judicata as 
to at least two major issues (duty and breach) in" the federal 
case, Trent, ____ F.3d ____, and the order would thus have 
required "all or an essential part of the federal suit to be 
litigated in a state forum."  Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 10 n.11. 
 
 
claim that the ordinance or the conduct of federal defendants was 
unconstitutional.2  
 The federal suit is a civil rights action for damages 
in which the Marcuses are the plaintiffs and the Township and 
various Township officials are the defendants.  While the issue 
of whether the Marcuses violated the ordinance may become 
relevant in that case, the focus of the litigation is the conduct 
and the motivations of the Township officials.  The issues will 
be whether these officials acted under color of state law, 
whether they were guilty of arbitrary and capricious conduct that 
deprived the Marcuses of a liberty or property interest, and if 
such a deprivation occurred, what amount of compensatory and/or 
punitive damages are appropriate under the circumstances. 
 Once the stay is lifted, the state court's disposition 
of the criminal proceeding will have a negligible impact on the 
subsequent federal adjudication.3  Because the causes of action 
                     
2.  The Marcuses advised the state court of their constitutional 
claims but solely for the purpose of attempting to reserve their 
right to subsequently litigate those claims in a federal forum.  
See England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 
411 (1964); Government & Civic Employees Org. Comm. v. Windsor, 
353 U.S. 364 (1957). 
3.  It is possible that a recent Supreme Court decision, Heck v. 
Humphrey, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S. Ct. 2364, 129 L. Ed. 2d 383 
(1994), precludes the Marcuses from successfully prosecuting all 
or a part of their § 1983 claim unless they can show that their 
conviction has been overturned.  If so, the stay issued in this 
case can only benefit the Marcuses' § 1983 case because it gives 
them the chance to seek a reversal of their state court criminal 
convictions before proceeding with their § 1983 claims.  Thus, 
the possible impact of the state proceedings on the federal ones 
under Heck will not deprive the Marcuses of their right to a 
federal adjudication of their § 1983 claim.  We emphasize, 
 
 
in the two proceedings are different, the criminal judgment will 
have no res judicata effect in the federal proceeding.  Safeguard 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 345 A.2d 664, 668 (Pa. 1975).  Because 
the issues in the federal suit are different from those in the 
state case, neither side will be foreclosed by collateral 
estoppel with respect to the federal issues.  The order from 
which the Marcuses appeal thus does not "surrender jurisdiction 
of a federal suit to a state court," Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 
10 n.11; it does not require that "all or an essential part of 
the federal suit . . . be litigated in a state forum," id.  
Rather, the effect of that order on the Marcuses' federal case is 
delay, and delay alone.      
 The "'mere prospect of delay'" does not create 
appellate jurisdiction where it would not otherwise exist.  Hoots 
v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 1347 (3d Cir. 1978) (quoting 
Brace v. O'Neill, 587 F.2d 237, 243 n.27a (3d Cir. 1977)).  For 
that reason, we have consistently held in circumstances similar 
to this that a stay order having only the effect of delay is not 
a final, appealable order.  Rolo v. General Dev. Corp., 949 F.2d 
695, 700-02 (3d Cir. 1991);4 Gold v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 
(..continued) 
however, that we express no view on the applicability of Heck to 
this case. 
4.  In Rolo, we held that an order staying a federal securities 
law case in light of on-going criminal and bankruptcy proceedings 
did not constitute a final order under the collateral-order 
doctrine announced in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 
U.S. 541 (1949).  Our analysis there supports a similar 
conclusion here.  The courts of appeals which have addressed the 
issue agree that a stay order, in the absence of extraordinary 
circumstances, does not meet the requirements of the collateral-
 
 
723 F.2d 1068, 1072 (3d Cir. 1983) (absent extraordinary 
circumstances an order granting a stay is not appealable); Brace 
v. O'Neill, 567 F.2d 237, 244 n.29a (3d Cir. 1977) (same); Cotler 
v. Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, P.A., 526 F.2d 537, 541 (3d 
Cir. 1975) (order staying proceedings in district court pending 
resolution of a state court suit with an overlapping factual 
background was not appealable); Arny v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 
266 F.2d 869, 870 (3d Cir. 1959).  
 
 C. 
 We realize, of course, that most stay orders entered 
upon the authority of Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976), are subject to immediate 
appellate review.  As the Supreme Court pointed out in Moses H. 
Cone, the Colorado River doctrine applies only if there is 
parallel state court litigation involving the same parties and 
issues that will completely and finally resolve the issues 
between the parties and, accordingly, a "decision to invoke 
Colorado River necessarily contemplates that the federal court 
will have nothing further to do in resolving any substantive part 
of the [federal] case, whether it stays or dismisses."  460 U.S. 
at 28.  In other words, because of the requirement of a parallel 
state court proceeding, stays entered under the authority of 
Colorado River will normally have the effect of putting the 
(..continued) 
order doctrine.  See cases collected at 15A Charles A. Wright et 
al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 3914.13, at 731-33  
nn.3, 5 (1992). 
 
 
plaintiff "effectively out of federal court" and surrendering 
jurisdiction to the state tribunal.  Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 9 
n.8. 
 In this case, the district court cited Colorado River 
in support of its decision to stay the proceedings before it.  
But our jurisdiction does not turn on the authority cited by the 
district court.  It turns, rather, on the effect of the order 
that the district court has entered.  If that order has deprived 
the federal plaintiff of a federal adjudication to which he or 
she may be entitled, it is a final order under Moses H. Cone and 
subject to immediate appellate review.  If, as here, the order 
only serves to delay the federal adjudication, it is not final 
and not appealable.5 
 
 III. 
 We will dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction. 
                     
5.  Nor is the district court's order in this case reviewable 
under our mandamus jurisdiction.  No one has suggested, and there 
is no reason to believe, that the federal adjudication will be 
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GARTH, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
 "It is the tradition of this court that the holding of 
a panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent panels.  
Thus, no subsequent panel overrules the holding in a published 
opinion of a previous panel.  Court in banc consideration is 
required to do so."  Third Circuit IOP 9.1.  Unfortunately, in 
permitting a federal district court to decline the proper 
exercise of its jurisdiction by its holding that we lack 
appellate jurisdiction to consider the Marcuses' appeal, the 
majority has ignored this tradition, and overruled two of our 
established precedents. 
 In a recently filed opinion dealing with appellate 
jurisdiction and Colorado River abstention, we have held that 
appellate jurisdiction attaches even when the district court 
retains substantial and continuing supervision over a federal 
action.  Trent v. Dial Medical of Florida, Inc., No. 92-2047, 
slip op. (3d Cir. August 12, 1994).  Moreover, we have held, 
albeit in a somewhat different context, that "where . . . a 
dismissal of an appeal will have the practical effect of denying 
later appellate review of a district court's underlying order, 
the underlying order must be final, within the meaning of 28 
U.S.C. § 1291."  Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671, 678 (3d 
Cir. 1994).  We also held that "where a separable and final 
 
 
determination has been made by the district court, whether 
substantive or jurisdictional, which determination triggers a 
remand [to state court], we will review both the underlying final 
order and the remand order itself."  Id. at 682-83. 
    Here, of course, we do not have a remand but, rather, a 
Colorado River abstention order that remits the proceedings to 
the state court.  The principle, however, is the same.  The 
district court cannot, by its order, deprive us of our review 
function. 
 Both of these decisions control the present case and 
lead to the inescapable conclusion that we have appellate 
jurisdiction over the Marcuses' appeal.  By holding otherwise, 
the majority condones a conflict with Trent, ignores the conflict 
with Carr, and permits an erroneous Colorado River order to go 
uncorrected.  The majority also discounts the fact that unless we 
review the district court's erroneous order at this time -- an 
order that even the majority must agree is erroneous (see Maj. 
Op. typescript at 8-10) -- it can never be reviewed or corrected 
by any appellate court whether state or federal. 
 I submit that a disposition leading to such an result 
should not be allowed.  For that reason, I dissent. 
 
 I 
 Although a stay order is not normally a final decision 
for purposes of § 1291, the Supreme Court held in Moses H. Cone 
 
 
Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), that 
a district court order granting a Colorado River stay order is 
immediately appealable where the district court judge intended to 
surrender federal jurisdiction to the state court so that "all or 
an essential part of the federal suit [will] be litigated in a 
state forum."  Id. at 10 n.11.  The Court noted in Moses H. Cone 
that a district court's "grant[] of a Colorado River motion 
necessarily contemplates that the federal court will have nothing 
further to do in resolving any substantive part of the case 
. . . ."  Id. at 28.6 
 
 A. 
                     
6. Moses H. Cone involved a contractor's appeal from an 
order staying a federal suit to compel arbitration.  When the 
order was entered, a suit was pending in state court that would 
by necessity resolve the issue of arbitration.  Accordingly, the 
district court stayed the federal suit pending the resolution of 
the state court proceeding pursuant to Colorado River Water 
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976). 
 The Supreme Court found the stay order was appealable 
either as a final order or as a collateral order.  The stay was 
final because all or substantially all issues would be resolved 
in the state court.  In so holding, the Court relied upon 
Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962), where the 
Court concluded that a stay entered pursuant to Railroad Comm'n 
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), was final, even though that 
stay was "entered with the expectation that the federal 
litigation will resume in the event that the plaintiff does not 
obtain relief in the state court on state law grounds."  Moses H. 
Cone, 460 U.S. at 10.  The Court also found that the stay was an 
appealable collateral order because it satisfied all the factors 
of Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 377 U.S. 541 (1949).  I 
discuss the collateral order doctrine and its application to the 
instant proceeding in section I.C. infra where I conclude, 
contrary to the majority, that the district court order here is 
reviewable as a collateral order. 
 
 
 The majority argues that, unlike the Colorado River 
stay order in Moses H. Cone, the district court's Colorado River 
stay order in the instant case "merely delays the federal 
litigation and does not effectively terminate it."  Maj. Op. 
typescript at 8.  In particular, the majority contends that  the 
district court's action "does not require 'that all or an 
essential part of the federal suit . . . be litigated in a state 
forum,'" but "[r]ather the effect of that order on the Marcuses' 
federal case is delay and delay alone."  Id. at 10.   
 How the majority can draw this conclusion from the 
district court's disposition is indeed as startling and misguided 
as it is wrong.  The district court, in ordering a Colorado River 
abstention, held (albeit erroneously) that the federal and state 
proceedings were sufficiently parallel so that the state court 
would resolve substantially all issues.  As the Supreme Court 
explained in Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 
U.S. 271 (1988), once the district court has determined that the 
federal and state proceedings are parallel, the conclusion is 
inevitable that substantially all issues will be resolved in the 
state court.  Id. at 278.  Indeed, the district court recognized 
this when it stated that plaintiffs "may be required to expose 
their federal claims in state court."  App. 45a.   
 Why else would the district court have abstained?  Its 
"stay order" was little more than a procedural formality and in 
reality stayed nothing.  The entire action was sent to the state 
 
 
court for resolution.  Why then a stay order?  The district court 
explained that "because the two proceedings are not strictly 
parallel, it is possible that the civil rights claim could remain 
for resolution at the conclusion of the state proceedings.  See 
Ingersoll-Rand Corp. v. Callison, 844 F.2d 133, 138 (3d Cir. 
1982)."  App. at 50a.  Callison however did not hold that we are 
precluded from reviewing an erroneous Colorado River abstention 
order where it is coupled with a stay.7  We can only surmise that 
the stay ordered in this case was no more than a "safety net" if, 
by chance, some aspect of the proceeding might return to the 
district court for adjudication.   
 As I have noted, and as my discussion of Colorado River 
abstention in section II infra bears out, the district court 
erred by abstaining.  On this point, I am satisfied that, had the 
majority reached the merits of the abstention issue, it would 
have agreed with me that abstention should not have been decreed.  
See Maj. Op. typescript at 8-9. 
                     
7. Callison involved a Colorado River abstention order 
issued by the district court which was upheld by this Court.  The 
district court in Callison however had dismissed the federal 
proceeding and we suggested that it should have stayed the 
federal proceeding.  We did not address any issues of appellate 
jurisdiction.  It is significant however that the district court 
may have relied upon Callison in entering its stay without 
appreciating the fact that it was at the same time incorrectly 
surrendering adjudication of all issues to the state court.  In 
any event, Callison did not hold that, where an erroneous grant 
of Colorado River abstention occurred, a stay entered in 




 Contrary to the position espoused by the majority, I 
cannot conclude -- and our precedents do not support the 
conclusion -- that we are divested of jurisdiction to consider 
the Marcuses' appeal at this time.  I suggest the majority's 
reasoning is seriously flawed.   
 The majority, without explicitly holding that the 
proceedings are not parallel, calls attention to the fact that 
the parties and the issues in the state and federal proceedings 
are different and hence implicitly not parallel.  Maj. Op. 
typescript at 8-9.  It concludes that issues will remain to be 
decided in the federal case after the state court proceeding has 
terminated.  Therefore, it reasons that the stay order only 
delays the resolution of those issues and accordingly the order 
is not appealable.   
 However, this reasoning deprives us of jurisdiction 
over an appeal of a Colorado River abstention order when review 
is most needed.  I cannot believe that Congress vested us with 
appellate jurisdiction to review Colorado River abstention/stay 
orders only in those cases where we conclude that the state and 
federal proceedings at issue are, in fact, parallel and, 
therefore, qualify for Colorado River abstention.  It is a 
perverse result indeed if we are prohibited from reviewing only 
those Colorado River abstention rulings involving state and 
federal proceedings that are neither parallel, nor identical, and 
 
 
which are thus erroneous.  Moses H. Cone obviously did not intend 
such a bizarre result. 
 My reading of Moses H. Cone draws support from our 
recent decision in Trent v. Dial Medical of Florida, Inc., No. 
92-2047, slip op. (3d Cir. August 12, 1994), a case in which we 
held that appellate jurisdiction vested despite an order 
retaining continuing supervision over the proceeding by the 
federal district court. 
 In Trent, the district court's order, though styled as 
a "dismissal," in fact retained control over the federal action: 
 The order provides that "the case is to 
remain in the status quo," "discovery and 
settlement discussion will continue in 
coordination with the action currently 
pending in [state court]."  It also instructs 
the parties that the judge will be amenable 
to intervening if the parties ask him to do 
so, and that they should keep him "advised of 
the status of this case and the state court 
action."  In the same vein, it provides that 
"[w]hen [the parties] are ready for trial or 
wish a settlement conference all that is 
necessary is to write directly to the court 
or set a telephone conference."  Moreover, 
since entering the order, the district court 
judge has denied a motion to stay discovery 
pending this appeal, thus perhaps implying 
that he expects discovery to continue because 
the case is still pending. 
Trent, slip op at 7-8.8  Despite the retentive nature of the 
district court's stay order, we held that it was a final 
                     
8. The order entered by the district court in Trent v. 
Dial Medical of Florida, No. 92-2047, slip op. (3d Cir. August 




appealable order because "the district court's order effectively 
prevents litigation of Trent's claims in federal court and 
requires him to abide by the state court decision . . . ."  Id. 
at 9. 
 In contrast to Trent, here the district court has 
severed all ties with the Marcuses' litigation.  It has not 
maintained contact with, and it is not available to, the parties 
involved.  The district court will not have an opportunity to 
revisit its Colorado River determination and its stay order.  As 
(..continued) 
  The motion of Edwin Snead . . . to 
intervene as a party plaintiff is GRANTED. 
 
  The motion of plaintiff Earl Trent for 
class certification is DENIED without 
prejudice. 
 
  This suit is DISMISSED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE.  This case is to remain in status 
quo and the Statute of Limitations is tolled. 
 
  It is further understood that all 
discovery and settlement discussions will 
continue in coordination with the action 
currently pending in Delaware County Court of 
Common Pleas styled Snead v. Community 
Dialysis Center, Inc. . . . . If intervention 
by the court is needed or desired, the 
parties may ask for assistance by either 
filing the appropriate motions, writing to 
the court or setting a telephone conference. 
 
  The parties shall keep the court advised 
of the status of this case and the state 
court action.  When they are ready for trial 
or wish a settlement conference all that is 
necessary is to write directly to the court 
or set a telephone conference. 
 
 
in Trent, "[i]t is clear that the district court judge expected 
that [the state proceedings] would resolve this case, at least in 
large part."  Id. at 8. 
 In all respects, Trent presented a much more borderline 
set of circumstances than is presented in the instant case.  Yet, 
in Trent, we held that finality attached.  Id. at 9-10.  A 
fortiori, we must reach the same the result here, if Trent is to 
be accorded due precedential effect.   
 The majority surprisingly does no more than give a 
passing nod to Trent in footnote 1 of its opinion.  It seeks to 
explain away Trent by the following quotation: "We there held 
that an order having the effect of staying a federal proceeding 
was appealable because a 'decision in [a parallel state 
proceeding would] constitute res judicata as to at least two 
major issues (duty and breach) in' the federal case."  Maj. Op. 
typescript at 8 n.1.  This characterization ignores the fact that 
Trent rejected the same "delay" argument that the majority now 
employs in order to preclude review of the Marcuses' appeal.  The 
appellee in Trent (like the majority) argued that the district 
court's order was merely intended "to afford the state court an 
opportunity to rule first on a common issue" as a matter of 
"docket control."  Trent, slip op. at 7.  Trent rejected this 
argument.  Despite the fact that the district court in Trent 
"recognize[d] that there may be some issues remaining after [the 
state proceeding] is disposed of" and despite its suggestion that 
 
 
"it might try the case whenever the parties (apparently jointly) 
seek a trial date," we found the order in Trent to be final and 
thus appealable.  Id. at 9.  We did so, because the stay in 
Trent, as the stay in the present case, "has the practical effect 
of a dismissal rather than merely delaying adjudication until 
completion of . . . state court proceedings."  Id.   
 I cannot understand how Trent, our most recent 
expression of finality in a Colorado River context, can be so 
summarily dismissed unless, as I believe it to be, any further 
discussion would lead to the same finality determination reached 
in Trent.  However, even if Trent had not been filed, thereby 
making it incumbent upon subsequent panels to follow its holding, 
Moses H. Cone, Carr and sheer logic dictate that our jurisdiction 
must attach.   
 
 B. 
 If we do not review the district court's erroneous 
Colorado River ruling at this time, that ruling never will be 
subject to review by any court.  Certainly the state court can 
not review the district court's abstention ruling.  Nor will we 
be able to review the district court's stay order.  The majority 
says that we cannot review it now and the issue as to whether or 
not the district court should have abstained, as well as the stay 
order, will be moot if the Marcuses' § 1983 action ever returns 
 
 
to federal court.  Thus, the district court's order effectively 
will be unreviewable. 
 We have recently cautioned against just such a result, 
in a somewhat different context.  In Carr v. American Red Cross, 
17 F.3d 671, 678-79 (3d Cir. 1994), we expressly held that a 
district court could not defeat appellate review of its own order 
dismissing the plaintiff's federal action by immediately 
remanding the parties to state court.  Rather, we held that 
"where . . . a dismissal of an appeal will have the practical 
effect of denying later appellate review of a district court's 
underlying order, the underlying order must be final, within the 
meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291."  Id. at 678. 
 Carr had brought an action in the Pennsylvania Court of 
Common Pleas against the American Red Cross and Osteopathic 
Medical Center, claiming that Osteopathic administered HIV 
infected blood that had been supplied by the American Red Cross.  
Osteopathic filed a cross claim against the Red Cross.  Red Cross 
invoked its federal charter and removed the action to the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  
Carr, having settled his claim with the Red Cross, then sought to 
remand the proceeding to the Court of Common Pleas, contending 
that the district court no longer had jurisdiction as a result of 
the release from Red Cross.  The district court granted Carr's 
motions to dismiss and to remand, reasoning that federal 
jurisdiction no longer existed.   
 
 
 We held that the district court's dismissal order would 
be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment and 
as a result its order being conclusive and collateral satisfied 
the collateral order doctrine.  We also held that the dismissal 
of Osteopathic's appeal would have the effect of denying 
appellate review of the district court's underlying order and as 
a result appeal under § 1291 was appropriate.  We pointed out 
that when the district court dismissed Red Cross from the action 
without reaching the merits of Osteopathic's cross claim, the 
dismissal order had in effect dismissed the cross claim.  Hence, 
when the district court remanded the cause of action to the 
Common Pleas court without Red Cross as a party, all litigation 
concerning the cross claim had been terminated.  We wrote: 
If we do not seize the opportunity to review the 
district court's dismissal order, that order will never 
be subject to review by any court, either state or 
federal.  Given the unique circumstances before us, we 
conclude that such an order, even if it were not to be 
considered final as a collateral final order (which we 
hold that it is), would nonetheless, be final under 
§ 1291, and that our hearing an appeal from such an 
order is consistent with federal policy against 
piecemeal appeals. 
 Thus we hold that the district court could not 
defeat appellate review of its February 22 order of 
dismissal -- a final order within the meaning of § 1291 
-- by immediate remand of the present case to state 
court. 
 
Id. at 678-79. 
 In the present case, where the district court's stay 
order will defeat any and all appellate review of its Colorado 
River determination, we are compelled by precedent and reason to 
 
 
conclude that the stay order is final under § 1291 and, hence, 
immediately reviewable by us.  In holding otherwise, the majority 
deliberately ignored our precedents.  Indeed, it did not even 
acknowledge Carr's existence when it refused to review the 
district court's order. 
 
 C. 
 Traditional "finality" analysis notwithstanding, the 
district court's order also is appealable as a collateral final 
order under Cohen v. Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).  
For an order to come under Cohen's collateral order exception to 
§ 1291's finality requirement, the order "must conclusively 
determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue 
completely separate from the merits of the action, and be 
effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."  
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978). 
 I conclude that this three-part test is satisfied for 
much the same reasons proffered by the Supreme Court in Moses H. 
Cone.  460 U.S. at 11-13.  Here, the "conclusiveness" prong of 
the test is satisfied inasmuch as the district court will never 
again have an opportunity to revisit its Colorado River 
determination, and its stay order.  Cf. Gulfstream Aerospace 
Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S. 271, 278 (1988) (holding 
denial of Colorado River motion is not final because "a district 
court usually will expect to revisit and reassess an order 
 
 
denying a stay," whereas granting a Colorado River motion 
"necessarily implies an expectation that the state court will 
resolve the dispute").  Indeed, not only will the district court, 
in the present case, be unable to reconsider its stay order in 
the future, but, in addition, if that order is deemed "non-final" 
for purposes of review, the district court will have effectively 
precluded our review of the stay order, and its underlying 
abstention determination. 
 The second prong is satisfied because "[a]n order that 
amounts to a refusal to adjudicate the merits plainly presents an 
important issue separate from the merits."  Moses H. Cone, 460 
U.S. at 12.  Here, of course, the district court stay order 
precludes any adjudication of the merits of the Marcuses § 1983 
action in federal court.  Finally, the third prong is satisfied 
because "this [stay] order would be entirely unreviewable if not 
appealed now," id., inasmuch as the abstention issue will be moot 
when and if ever the Marcuses' § 1983 action returns to federal 
court. 
 The majority seeks to bolster its conclusion that we 
cannot review the district court's order by referring to the 
appealability of a general stay order.  (Maj. Op. typescript at 
10-11.)  The majority cites five cases9 for the principle that a 
                     
9.Rolo v. General Dev. Corp., 949 F.2d 695 (3d Cir. 1991); Gold 
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 723 F.2d 1068 (3d Cir. 1983); 
Brace v. O'Neill, 567 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1977); and Cotler v. 
Inter-County Orthopaedic Ass'n, P.A., 526 F.2d 537 (3d Cir. 




stay order, having only the effect of delay, is not a final, 
appealable order.  I have no problem with that principle, except 
that it does not apply to the present appeal.  First, none of the 
five cases which the majority cites involved Colorado River 
abstention, whether correctly granted or not.  Second, none of 
the cases involved the extraordinary circumstance of a district 
court insulating its own Colorado River abstention order (in this 
case erroneous) from review by combining its abstention 
determination with a stay order.  Third, none of the five cases 
discusses the collateral order doctrine in the context presented 
here.  Thus, the majority's reliance on those cases is misplaced 
as the analysis and reasoning of those authorities are 
inapplicable to the issue here. 
 Accordingly, even if the district court's stay order 
was not "final" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 -- which I 
would hold that it is -- the stay order is reviewable as a 




 In sum, I conclude that the district court's December 
23, 1993 order staying the Marcuses' § 1983 action for damages is 
a final order under Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury 
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), and Trent v. Dial Medical of 
Florida, Inc., No. 92-2047, slip op. (3d Cir. August 12, 1994).  
 
 
It is also an order that Carr v. American Red Cross, 17 F.3d 671 
(3d Cir. 1994), requires us to review at this time.  
Alternatively, it is a collateral final order under Cohen v. 
Beneficial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).  It follows then that 
we have jurisdiction to review the district court's 
abstention/stay order.  As noted, two valid precedents of this 
Court -- Trent and Carr -- compel this result. 
 Because the district court's stay order, and its 
erroneous Colorado River determination upon which the stay was 
predicated, are so inextricably intertwined, the jurisdictional 
holding that I espouse requires additional discussion of the 
district court abstention ruling, even though the majority has 
declined to address that issue directly.  The majority's 
reasoning suggests, as I have concluded, that because the 
elements of the Colorado River abstention doctrine are not 
present in this case, Colorado River abstention was not available 
for the district court to order. 
 
 II 
 In Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Solebury Township, 671 F.2d 
743, 746 (3d Cir. 1982), we explained that "[a]bstention is a 
judicially created doctrine under which a federal court will 
decline to exercise its jurisdiction so that a state court or 
state agency will have the opportunity to decide the matters at 
issue."  Nevertheless, the circumstances under which a federal 
 
 
court may abstain from granting certain types of relief, and to 
decline to exercise its jurisdiction, are severely limited.  See 
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 
(1989).10 
 As a general matter, "federal courts lack the authority 
to abstain from the exercise of jurisdiction that has been 
conferred," inasmuch as they have an "unflagging obligation" to 
decide cases within their jurisdiction.  Id. at 358; see Deakins 
v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988).  "When a Federal court is 
properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law 
jurisdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction . . . . 
The right of a party plaintiff to choose a Federal court where 
there is a choice cannot properly be denied."  Willcox v. 
Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909) (citations omitted).  
Thus, it is well settled that "the pendency of an action in the 
state court is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter 
in the Federal court having jurisdiction."  McClellan v. Carland, 
217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910).  Absent "exceptional circumstances," 
even the existence of a parallel state proceeding provides 
insufficient reason for a federal court to refuse to exercise 
jurisdiction with which it properly is vested. 
                     
10. Judge Rosenn's recent opinion in Grode v. Mutual Fire, 
Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 953 (3d Cir. 1993), briefly 
summarizes the history and elements of the available abstention 
doctrines, including Colorado River abstention. 
 
 
 On the other hand, in Colorado River Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818 (1976), and again in 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 
(1983), the Supreme Court held that a federal court may abstain 
from exercising jurisdiction in deference to a pending parallel 
state proceeding, based on considerations of "wise judicial 
administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial 
resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation."  Colorado 
River, 424 U.S. at 817. 
 Colorado River abstention only applies, however, "in 
situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent 
jurisdiction . . . by state and federal courts."  Id.  That is, 
the federal and state court proceedings must be concurrent and 
duplicative for a federal court to consider abstaining pursuant 
to Colorado River.  General Glass Indus. Corp. v. Monsour Medical 
Foundation, 973 F.2d 197, 199 (3d Cir. 1992).  Those "[c]ases 
that are not truly duplicative do not invite Colorado River 
deference."  Trent v. Dial Medical of Florida, Inc., No. 92-2047, 
slip op. at 11 (3d Cir. August 12, 1994). 
 Even when the state and federal proceedings are 
parallel, the federal court may abstain only under "exceptional 
circumstances."  Colorado River, 424 U.S at 818.  In Colorado 
River, and then in Moses H. Cone, the Supreme Court weighed six 
factors in analyzing whether the requisite "exceptional 
circumstances" existed.  Before an "exceptional circumstances" 
 
 
analysis is undertaken, however, the district court first must be 
satisfied that the state and federal proceedings are, in fact, 
parallel. 
 In the present case, the district court concluded that 
the state and federal proceedings, though not identical, were 
parallel.  After analyzing the six Colorado River/Moses H. Cone 
factors, the district court chose to abstain from exercising its 
jurisdiction. 
 The Marcuses argue on appeal, as they did before the 
district court, that the Colorado River doctrine is inapplicable 
to the present case because the federal and state proceedings are 
not parallel for purposes of Colorado River abstention.  That is, 
they argue that: (1) the issues before the state and federal 
courts are different, as are the parties and the facts; (2) the 
state court action cannot afford them the relief they seek in 
federal court; and (3) the resolution of the state court action 




 As in all cases in which we are asked to review a 
district court's decision to abstain, we must determine, as a 
threshold matter, "[w]hether this case falls in the range [of 
cases] within which a district court may exercise discretion [to 
abstain]," a question over which we exercise plenary review. 
 
 
Grode v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 953, 957 
(3d Cir. 1993).  That is, we must determine whether the state and 
federal proceedings at issue here are indeed parallel, inasmuch 
as Colorado River abstention is otherwise inapplicable.  Trent, 
slip op. at 11-12 (recognizing that court must first determine 
whether state and federal proceedings are parallel). 
 Although federal and state actions need not be wholly 
identical in order for a district court to deem them "parallel," 
the two actions will not be deemed parallel unless they are 
substantially similar.  Compare Caminiti and Iatarola v. Behnke 
Warehousing Inc., 962 F.2d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding 
slight difference in parties and issues is insufficient to 
destroy parallel nature of two proceedings where granting of 
relief requested in state court would dispose of all claims 
raised in federal action); Nakash v. Marciano, 882 F.2d 1411, 
1416-17 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding suits to be parallel where 
federal action is but a "spin-off" of more comprehensive state 
litigation) with University of Md. v. Peat Marwick Main & Co., 
923 F.2d 265, 276 n.16 (3d Cir. 1991) (noting that where federal 
claimant's claims are not subject to review in a state forum, 
there can be no "parallel" state court litigation on the basis of 





 The federal and state proceedings at issue here clearly 
are not "parallel" under Colorado River.  As a general matter, a 
§ 1983 action may be brought in either a state or federal forum.  
Thus, conceivably, concurrent state and federal jurisdiction 
could exist over the Marcuses' damages claim.  In the present 
case, however, the state action is criminal in nature and was 
initiated by the State of Pennsylvania in its criminal court.  
Pennsylvania law makes no provision by which the Marcuses could 
raise their § 1983 claim in a state criminal forum.  See Hutchins 
v. Commonwealth, Pa. State Police Harrisburg, 604 A.2d 1130, 1131 
(Pa. Commw. 1992) (holding civil action cannot be joined to a 
criminal appeal). 
 As a consequence, the Pennsylvania criminal court is 
precluded from addressing any of the civil claims, or providing 
any of the remedies, that the Marcuses presently seek to have 
adjudicated in their federal proceeding.11  These deficiencies 
                     
11. A difference in remedies is a factor counseling in 
favor of the denial of a motion to abstain even where the parties 
to both actions are virtually identical.  New Beckley Mining 
Corp. v. International Union, UMWA, 946 F.2d 1072, 1074 (4th Cir. 
1991). 
 "The difference in remedies becomes more pronounced 
when one suit requires a jury and the other does not . . . ."  
Id.  Here, the Marcuses have demanded that a jury decide the 
issues raised in their federal § 1983 action, and ask for an 
award of compensatory and punitive damages.  In contrast, the 
state criminal action that the Marcuses presently are appealing 
was a non-jury proceeding before a district justice.  The only 
relief they can hope to obtain in the state proceedings now is a 
reversal of their criminal conviction. 
 
 
are critical.  Absent the state criminal court's exercise of 
concurrent jurisdiction over the Marcuses' § 1983 claim, the 
state proceedings -- the parties involved, the issues implicated, 
and the relief sought therein -- are wholly different from and, 
therefore, not substantially similar to, the federal proceedings 
initiated by the Marcuses. 
 First, the federal civil and state criminal actions 
clearly involve different parties.  See, e.g., Baskin v. Bath Tp. 
Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 15 F.3d 569 (6th Cir. 1994).12  In the 
federal civil lawsuit, the Marcuses have sued the Township, 
Vollrath, Matteo, and Ferrara as defendants-appellees.  In the 
state criminal action, the State of Pennsylvania is the moving 
party against the Marcuses. 
                     
12. Like the present case, Baskin involved state and 
federal proceedings arising out of disputes related to township 
zoning variances.  The Sixth Circuit reversed the district 
court's Colorado River abstention order, holding that the state 
and federal proceedings were not parallel: 
 
 The two actions arise out of the same basic 
facts, but they each contest a different 
aspect of the variance granted by the 
Township zoning board and they seek different 
relief.  The state court action, in which 
Baskin intervened as a defendant, was brought 
by disgruntled homeowners against both the 
Township and the Board.  The homeowners 
argued that the variance granted by the Board 
was excessive.  The federal court action, 
however, was brought by Baskin against the 
Township and the Board.  In this suit, Baskin 
argued that the variance was too restrictive.  
The homeowners were not parties to the 
federal case. 
 
15 F.3d at 572. 
 
 
 Second, while the state and federal actions may 
implicate some common factual issues insofar as the Marcuses' 
compliance or noncompliance with land use requirements is 
concerned, the Marcuses' federal claims raise additional factual 
questions concerning, among other things, the alleged acts and 
conspiracy by Township officials to "harass, intimidate, 
embarrass, annoy, [and] abuse" the Marcuses. 
 Quite simply, I cannot discern how the state criminal 
action, brought by the State of Pennsylvania against the 
Marcuses, will resolve the federal civil action, brought by the 
Marcuses against the Township and Township officials.  
Conversely, I do not see how the resolution of the Marcuses' 
federal § 1983 action will affect the state criminal proceeding.  
In contrast to Colorado River, where the issues to be decided by 
the state and federal forums were essentially the same,13 the two 
actions here differ in almost all respects. 
 
 C. 
 Inasmuch as the state and federal proceedings are not 
sufficiently similar as to constitute parallel proceedings under 
Colorado River, in my opinion, the Marcuses' § 1983 claim does 
not even fall in the range of cases within which the district 
                     
13. For example, in Colorado River, the Supreme Court held 
that the district court should abstain from entertaining an 
action brought by the United States government to settle water 
rights respecting the Colorado River when state proceedings to 
settle such rights were already underway in a state forum. 
 
 
court would be permitted to exercise its discretion to abstain.  
Consequently, I would not even address the district court's 
analysis of the Colorado River/Moses H. Cone factors to determine 
whether the district court abused its discretion in finding that 
"exceptional circumstances" existed which warranted its 
abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over the Marcuses' § 1983 
claim.  See, e.g., Sheerbonnet, Ltd. v. American Express Bank, 
Ltd., 17 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1994) (Pratt, J.), petition for 
cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3827 (May 27, 1994) (No. 93-1889); Fox 
v. Maulding, 16 F.3d 1079, 1081 (10th Cir. 1994).  In my view, 
the district court erred as a matter of law when it stayed the 
Marcuses' § 1983 action, relying on Colorado River abstention, 
and that error should be corrected on the Marcuses' appeal. 
 
 III 
 In sum, I would hold that the district court's stay 
order was final for purposes of appellate review.  Consequently, 
I would reach the merits of the Marcuses' appeal.  Having 
considered the parties' arguments, I conclude that the district 
court's December 23, 1993 Colorado River stay order must be 
reversed on the basis that the state criminal proceeding against 
the Marcuses, and the Marcuses' § 1983 action against the 
Township, are not concurrent and parallel proceedings in which 
"substantially the same parties litigate substantially the same 
issues in different forums."  New Beckley Mining Corp. v. 
 
 
International Union, UMWA, 946 F.2d at 1073 (4th Cir. 1991).  
 Because the majority dismisses the Marcuses' appeal by 
erroneously holding, in conflict with this court's precedents, 
that we have no jurisdiction to review an admittedly erroneous 
district court abstention ruling, I respectfully dissent. 
